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Abstract
Finding effective solutions to manage marine resources is high on political and conservation agendas worldwide. This is
made more urgent by the rate of increase in the human population and concomitant resource pressures in coastal areas.
This paper links empirical socio-economic data about perceptions of marine resource health to the breaking of marine
management rules, using fisheries as a case study. The relationship between perceived rule-breaking (non-compliance with
regulations controlling fishing) and perceived health of inshore marine environments was investigated through face-to-face
interviews with 299 heads of households in three Tanzanian coastal communities in November and December 2011.
Awareness of rules controlling fishing activity was high among all respondents. Fishers were able to describe more specific
rules controlling fishing practices than non-fishers (t = 3.5, df = 297, p,0.01). Perceived breaking of fishing regulations was
reported by nearly half of all respondents, saying ‘‘some’’ (32% of responses) or ‘‘most’’ (15% of responses) people break
fishing rules. Ordinal regression modelling revealed a significant linkage (z =23.44, p,0.001) in the relationship between
respondents’ perceptions of deteriorating marine health and their perception of increased rule-breaking. In this paper,
inferences from an empirical study are used to identify and argue the potential for using perceptions of ecosystem health
and level of rule-breaking as a means to guide management measures. When considering different management options
(e.g. Marine Protected Areas), policy makers are advised to take account of and utilise likely egoistic or altruistic decision-
making factors used by fishers to determine their marine activities.
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Introduction
Rule-breaking by resource users is a common explanation for
fisheries management failing to achieve sustainability and conser-
vation goals worldwide. An increasing amount of information
shows significant and negative impacts of fishers’ rule-breaking on
fish stocks, national economies and global trade [1]. However,
finding solutions to achieve compliance to support sustainable
marine resources management remains a global unresolved
challenge. Understanding the reasoning, perceptions, pressures
and socio-economic drivers behind decisions made by fishers, at all
scales, to break fishing rules remains central to achieving
compliance and viable fish stock management [2,3]. Understand-
ing and integrating the context-specific characteristics of rule-
breaking allows management measures to be tailored to address
rather than compound local issues.
Research to date has attempted to describe rule-breaking’s
justification through moral objections or through fisher’s reasoned
decisions to comply or not. In the first instance rule-breaking by
fishers is favoured by their view that rules are unfair or illogical,
that rules are contrary to their conscience, or that rule-breaking is
morally acceptable due to higher needs, for example, one must
catch fish by any means in order to feed one’s family [4]. Equally,
fishers may break rules set by authorities they do not respect or
accept as ruling their fishing areas (lack of co-governance). Yet,
despite the agreed importance of belief systems and moral aspects
in rule-breaking, it is most commonly argued that fisheries rule-
breaking stems from simple economic cost:benefit analysis [1,4].
Using similar assumptions to rational choice theory in criminol-
ogy, Sumaila et al [1] argue that fishers decide as individuals in a
calculated manner whether it fulfils their immediate economic
needs and is worthwhile to risk breaking the rules controlling
fishing [5]. When applying this model, fishers may decide whether
the benefits of increased catch and/or reduced catch effort
obtained through breaking rules controlling fishing will be greater
than: 1) cost of being caught (fines/confiscation), including an
inherent calculation of likelihood of being caught and cost of
avoidance behaviour required; 2) perceived benefit of complying;
3) social implications of fisher’s involvement in rule-breaking.
Sumaila et al. [1], argue that in most cases this cost:benefit analysis
favours the decision to break rules.
If these assumptions are correct, the above model predicts a
global economic weighting towards rule-breaking which can be
explained by the relatively low chances of being caught breaking
rules due to the geographical size of marine areas required to be
monitored, insufficient resources to enforce rules and lack of
economic viability of enforcement [6]. While enforcement can be
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effective in smaller defined marine areas, such as no-take zones or
small marine protected areas, most nations have insufficient
resources and capacity to effectively enforce fishing laws over the
majority of their territorial waters [1,7].
Increasingly draconian and complex laws along with heavy
punishments also generally lead to a continuous cycle of increased
rule-breaking among fishers due to confusion, resentment and loss
of respect for rules [8]. Furthermore, there exists a lack of self–
enforcement of fishing rules, i.e. fishermen are generally unlikely
to inform on their rule-breaking colleagues. Commonly, with
external actors unable to enforce rules, and a lack of enforcement
by other fishers, individual fishers are solely responsible for
deciding if a rule will be broken [8]. Thus studying socio-economic
drivers that underpin individual decision-making behaviour can
identify a range of factors which may be linked to likelihood of
rule-breaking under different local conditions. This information
can be applied to a wide range of marine management scenarios
globally as part of using context-specific knowledge to promote
and gain support for specific rules.
Where enforcement is ineffective or of secondary importance,
individual fisher’s compliance can be dependent on personal
conviction on the one hand and on societal expectation on the
other. Fishers may be more likely to comply if they feel social
pressure or moral obligation to accept them [2,9]. If community
and individual/household conditions are appropriate, then per-
ceived and actual involvement of individual fishers in rule-making
and management (i.e. co-management and co-enforcement) can
be effective in making rules more logical and morally acceptable to
fishers, and also increases awareness of rules [10]. Co-management
has been credited with supporting positive effects in compliance
within coastal resource management programmes worldwide,
despite the measures taken often offering no economic benefits on
the fishers who support them [11,12].
In the current research we argue, individual perceptions (what
individuals perceive or believe they perceive as states, such as
marine ecosystem health, or occurrences) while representative and
subjective, can influence reasoning and ultimately behavioural
choices. To illustrate, an awareness and acceptance of the problem
related to a specific rule (in this case health of a threatened marine
fish stock) has been shown to have a positive effect on willingness
to comply with that rule, although the underlying stimuli can be
complex [13,14]. Jager et al. [4] showed that concern about levels
of fish depletion increased fishers’ belief that rule-breaking was
unacceptable in the case of fishing for food, although this did not
extend to the fishers own target species when examined in view of
expected fishing income from commercial stocks. Fishers’ accep-
tance of a specific environmental problem or overall stock
degradation and the clearly communicated association of that
problem with fishing rules intended to counter it may increase
individual willingness to comply. It is unclear whether this applies
at a societal level, resulting in pressure or expectation to comply.
Effective fisheries management, including clear communication
about enforcement efforts and regulatory measures can benefit
from being formed on the basis of information about how fishers
and societies they belong to perceive rule-breaking. The current
study aims to contribute to understanding of the reasoning,
perceptions and socio-economic drivers underlying fishers’ deci-
sion-making about how they fish, specifically about breaking of
fishing rules.
This paper reports the findings from interviews with 299 heads
of households in three fishing communities in the United Republic
of Tanzania. The perceptions of respondents, both fishers and
non- fishers, within fishing communities, that is, the society fishers
belong to, are analysed specifically to isolate the social variables
statistically linked to perceived rule-breaking. Identifying relevant
perceptions and associations to compliance allows a discussion of
potential effects on behavioural choice. From a proactive
management stance this knowledge can be used to map out
scenarios to be presented to local communities to communicate
possible consequences of their actions. This can allow informed
choice, for example, about which conservation measures are more
likely to have favourable outcomes and thus be supported. The
overall aim is to understand relevant socio-economic variables that
may find application in improving fisheries management, thus
supporting recommendations for future use in management
options and policy making.
Methods
2.1 Ethics statement
Ethics approval was sought and obtained for this study through
submission of an ethics assessment to the Newcastle University
Ethical Committee by which all methods including verbal consent
were deemed acceptable and of no ethical concern. Researchers
obtained verbal consent from participants before conducting
household surveys. In this case consent was documented only in
completion of the interview cover sheet (i.e. a survey ID was
assigned and the interviewer recorded their own name and began
interviewing). The verbal consent procedure ensured (as a
minimum) participants were informed about the survey, its
purpose, and how the data would be utilized and were informed
they would receive reports on findings at community presenta-
tions. Written consent was not sought as it was possible that the
low literacy level of a number of respondents would have made
written consent unrepresentative of actual consent. Participant’s
names were not recorded nor were other personal details which
could be used to identify individual respondents.
2.2 Survey design
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 299 heads of
households in three coastal villages - Ununio, Kunduchi and
Buyuni -in the United Republic of Tanzania in November and
December 2011 (Figure 1). Study sites varied according to
economic status, proximity to the coast and dependence on
small-scale fisheries. To summarise:
N Ununio is 20 kilometres north of Dar-es-Salaam (estimated
population 1050; 168 households).
N Kunduchi is 15 km north of Dar-es-Salaam (estimated
population 1370; 212 households).
N Buyuni is 50 km south of Dar-es-Salaam, (estimated popula-
tion 1100; 204 households).
Ununio and Kunduchi are (‘diffuse’) peri-urban fishing villages
on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, with encroachment of urban
expansion on land area for agriculture and construction [15].
Buyuni is rural, and requires 3–4 hours car travel to reach from
Dar es Salaam. There is no known history of co-management or
participation in rule-making within the three fishing villages, there
is however a no-take Marine Protected Area on Mbudya Island in
close proximity to Kunduchi which is partially operated by ex-
fishers.
Villages were mapped using satellite images as a reference and
ground-proofed by in-field observations to create full hand-drawn
maps of all roads, pathways and dwellings. Maps were then used to
systematically sample (numbered) households within each com-
munity. The head of household of every second house was
interviewed.
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‘Household’ was defined as a unit of people that share a house
[16]. Heads of households were interviewed where possible as
decision-makers considered to hold more detailed information
about current livelihoods, income and socio-economic character-
istics. If the head of household was not available at the second visit,
interviewers requested to interview an adult from the household
fully informed about the household’s full range of income-related
activities and livelihoods.
Data collected from the interviews described respondents’
dependence on marine resources and perceptions of marine
health. Respondents discussed their current economic status and
employment along with awareness of rules to control fishing
activity (open) and were asked questions focussed on whether
people break these rules. Response options were not prescriptive
or numerical but were designed to provide a simple ordinal-scale
estimate of perceived levels of rule-breaking. Thus response
options to the question ‘‘Do people break these rules?’’ were: Yes,
most people break them; Yes, some people break them; Yes, but
very few people break them; No, no-one breaks them.
Household income, possessions and utilities, such as electricity,
mobile phone and other physical assets such as house construction
types (e.g. cement) combined with land and house ownership were
recorded and used as indicators of wealth.
2.3 Material Style of Life
A material style of life (MSL) unitary measure was calculated on
the basis of rotated component weightings obtained using a factor
analysis with Varimax rotation applied to all data for presence or
absence of key assets [17]. Key assets examined were all household
possessions and utilities examined in interviews. These were
equivalent to the selection in previous analysis of fisher village
survey data as detailed by Cinner et al. [17] with the additions
made in the current study including land ownership, ownership of
mobile phones, availability of water services and availability of
electricity. Assets with weightings between 0.3 or 20.3 in first and
second components after Varimax rotation were excluded.
Remaining factor weightings for all individuals were summed to
create a compact MSL score for each respondent household
(Figure 2).
2.4 Statistical analysis and ordinal regression modelling
A cumulative link model [18] was fitted to the data with
responses to the ordinal variable ‘perception of rule-breaking’ (for
rules controlling fishing) as the dependent variable with four
ordered response categories as follows:
4 - Yes, most people break the rules
3 - Yes, some people break them
Figure 1. Map of Tanzania with expanded area central coast of Tanzania indicating position of coastal villages from North to South:
A. Ununio, B. Kunduchi, and C. Buyuni. (Source https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/Tanzania.html).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.g001
Figure 2. Factor weightings following Varimax Rotation, values indicate contribution of factors (if present) to overall Material Style
of Life score, n=299.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.g002
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2 - Yes, but very few people break them
1 – No, no-one breaks them
The following independent variables were selected following a
critical appraisal of relevant literature and included in the
cumulative link model, constructed using the ordinal package in
R Statistical software (Table 1; Figure 3; Figure 4):
1. Is fishing a reliable source of income? (yes/no)
2. Estimate of environmental health of the sea (much better/
better/same/worse/much worse)
3. Social network strength (Rating 1–3 depending on participa-
tion/decision-making in community)
4. Material style of life (MSL)
5. Weekly income per person in household (Tanzanian Shillings -
TZS)
6. Occupation (fisher, farmer, businessperson, fishmonger, other)
7. Years of formal education (years)
8. Age (years)
9. Gender (male/female)
10. Immigrant (yes/no)
In order to compare the perceptions of fishers with that of the
community as a whole, a separate cumulative link model was
constructed incorporating only the responses of commercially
active fishers (those who derive income from their catch) with the
same variables excluding the variable Occupation.
Each ordinal regression model was refined by removal of the
variable with the highest p-value (non-significant variables)
stepwise and by refitting the model accordingly. The empirical
identifiability (goodness of definition) was determined on the basis
of the condition number of the Hessian; numbers below 104 were
considered an acceptable level of definition.
Where applicable data were tested for normality and homoge-
neity of variances using Shapiro-Wilk and Levene’s test respectively
Figure 3. Distribution of occupations by village and all respondents, n =292.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.g003
Table 1. Mean values of demographic data, response variables and key socio-economic indicators by village (n = 299,
TZS = Tanzanian Shilling, HH=Household, Env. = environmental).
Village
Buyuni Kunduchi Ununio All villages
Factor/variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Age 38 (13) 39 (13) 36 (13) 38 (13)
Years of education 5 (3) 5 (4) 6 (4) 5 (4)
Weekly income per person [23] 13,575 (12,298) 23,902 (22,128) 23,070 (22,515) 19,771 (19,686)
Total household inhabitants 6 (3) 5 (4) 6 (4) 5 (4)
Material Style of Life 20.3 (1.9) 2.2 (0.8) 1.9 (1.2) 1.2 (1.8)
Social network strength 1(1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
% responses % responses % responses % responses
Respondent - Female 39.1 53.5 52.3 47.8%
HH main income fishery 35.2 68.1 46.5 49.5%
HH main income other 64.8 31.9 53.5 50.5%
Fishing reliable income? - yes 73.2 69.2 61.9 68.4
Immigrant – born elsewhere 55.5 78.2 63.6 65.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.t001
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before application of parametric statistical tests. An independent
samples t-test was applied to compare means of rule awareness
between fishers and non-fishers.
Results
The following results section begins by establishing the level of
dependence on marine resources and socio-economic status of the
interviewed villages. Comparative awareness of rules controlling
fishing and respondents’ perceptions on the level of rule-breaking
amongst community members are then introduced. Finally an
ordinal regression model reveals how explanatory variable(s)
retained in the model explain levels of perceived rule-breaking.
3.1 Marine resource dependence and socioeconomic
status of communities
All villages exhibited high dependence on marine and coastal
resources, with between 35.2% (Buyuni) and 68.1% (Kunduchi) of
households in each village ranking fishing or fish marketing as
their main income source (Table 1; Figure 3). Respondents in peri-
urban villages Kunduchi (TZS23,902622,128 SD) and Ununio
(TZS 23,070622,515 SD), reported higher per capita income than
the rural villagers of Buyuni (TZS 13,575612,298SD) however
values did not differ significantly. Peri-urban villages had more
developed infrastructure – piped water and electricity - due to
their proximity to urban networks (Table 1). Respondents from
Ununio had the highest mean number of years of education
(6.0763.9 SD) and social network (measured as combined score
for participation in groups and involvement in decisions at group
and village level) strength score (1.161.0 SD). The majority of
respondents (68.4%) felt that fishing was a reliable source of
income. More than half of respondents (65.6%) were not born in
the village they were currently living in and 70.9% of respondents
felt that the environmental health of the sea was worse or much
worse than in previous years (Figure 4).
3.2 Awareness of rules controlling fishing activity
The majority (86.0%) of respondents described at least one rule
controlling fishing activity (Table 2). In open and multiple
response questioning, fishers described significantly (t = 3.5,
df = 297, p,0.01) more specific rules on average (mean= 1.760.1
SE) than non-fishers (mean= 1.460.1 SE). The most common
rule named by all respondents was the ban on use of explosives in
fishing (136 mentions/29.7% of total mentions) followed by need
for an appropriate fishing license (105 mentions/22.9% of total
mentions) for artisanal and commercial fisheries and limits to net
mesh size for net fishing (81 mentions/17.7% of total mentions ).
Bans on fishing with poisons such as cyanide (13 mentions/2.8%
of total mentions) and the recent ban on beach seine fishing
methods (13 mentions/2.8% of total mentions) were mentioned
least frequently (Table 2).
3.3 Perceptions on breaking of rules controlling fishing
activity
When asked whether people break the afore-mentioned rules,
41.0% of respondents answered that ‘only very few people or
individuals’ break the rules, 31.5% of respondents answered that
‘some people break the rules’, 14.9% answered that ‘most people
break the rules’ and the remaining 12.6% responded that ‘no-one
breaks fishery rules and regulations’ (Table 2). A total of 77
interviewees or 26% of total interviewees were not willing or able
to provide a response to this question.
3.4 Ordinal regression modelling
Stepwise removal of explanatory variables to refine the ordinal
regression model resulted in a final model - for all respondents -
which retained three significant explanatory variables:
1. Estimate of environmental health of the sea (much better/
better/same/worse/much worse)
2. Immigrant (yes/no)
3. Gender (male/female)
Respondent’s estimate of environmental health of the sea
exhibited the greatest effect size and significance in the final
ordinal regression model (Table 3). The final model predicts
perception of rule-breaking to be significantly higher among
respondents who; 1) think the sea is less healthy, 2) are immigrants,
and 3) are male (Table 3).
Stepwise removal of explanatory variables to refine the second
ordinal regression model, using responses of fishers only (100%
male respondents), resulted in a final model - for all respondents -
which retained two significant explanatory variables:
1. Estimate of environmental health of the sea (much better/
better/same/worse/much worse)
Figure 4. Distribution of individual response by village and all respondents for estimate of environmental health of the sea,
n=250.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.g004
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2. Immigrant (yes/no)
The results of the final and refined model predicts perception of
rule-breaking to be significantly higher among immigrant fishers
and those fishers who think the sea is less healthy (Table 4).
Discussion
The current research identifies for the first time a statistically
significant linkage between increased individual perceptions of
fisheries rule-breaking and individual perceptions of worsening
marine environmental health, based on empirical evidence. The
findings are valuable in identifying this relationship, dependent
variables and perceptions that influence resource users’ environ-
mental problem awareness and thus may influence their behav-
ioural patterns. This information about natural resource health,
perceptions and the way in which this knowledge may influence
decision-making can be used to improve management and policy
formulation. This can result in targeted individuals being more
likely to support rules, especially if they are tailored and explained
within the context of local priorities derived from empirical data
that local people were involved in providing and can relate to.
With governments around the world increasing implementation
of fishery and marine management measures as conservation tools,
this study is timely for policy advisers in offering advice on what
variables should be determined to understand the likely efficacy of
rules and measures controlling stakeholders. We predict that this
information, if considered and built upon, will help the formula-
tion of rules that are more likely to gain support and achieve
greater compliance among communities socially and economically
dependent on vulnerable marine resources such as over-exploited
fisheries. Given the limited resources and capacity available for
enforcement, a targeted approach is more likely to be successful in
Table 3. Ordinal regression model (logistic) all respondents’ responses to perception of rule-breaking for rules controlling fishing.
(a) Estimate Standard Error z value Pr(.|z|)
Gender 0.7514 0.2730 2.7521 0.0059218
Environmental health of sea 20.4894 0.1423 23.4392 0.0005834
Immigrant status 0.7320 0.2749 2.6633 0.0077369
(b) Estimate Standard Error z value
1|2 21.5763 0.8295 21.9004
2|3 0.2417 0.8195 0.2949
3|4 2.5094 0.8457 2.9671
(a) Retained explanatory variables all respondents (n = 201). (b) Threshold coefficients: (log-likelihood: 2241.1900, AIC: 494.3801, Condition number of Hessian:
2288.399).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.t003
Table 2. Rule awareness (n = 299), rules mentioned/described (n = 299) and respondent perceptions of rule-breaking (n = 222).
Variable Response category No. of responses (n) % responses
Number of rules described 0 42 14.0
1 85 28.4
2 147 49.2
3 21 7.0
4 4 1.3
Rule description/mentions No explosives 136 29.7
Licensing 105 22.9
Net mesh limits 81 17.7
No spears/guns 19 4.1
No beach seine 13 2.8
Equipment bans 18 3.9
Fish size limit 19 4.1
No poison fishing 13 2.8
Methods bans 17 3.7
Others 37 8.1
Do people break fishing rules? Yes, most of them 33 14.9
Yes, some 70 31.5
Yes, but very few 91 41.0
No, no-one 28 12.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.t002
Perceived Rule-Breaking and Marine Ecosystems
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e89156
reconciling conservation with sustainable livelihoods and, more
generally, marine management goals.
Coastal villages in this study in the United Republic of
Tanzania, as in many other parts of the developing world, are
still heavily dependent on marine resources for income generation
and food security [19]. [19] Most respondents believe that the
health of this pivotal marine resource is worsening and while most
are aware of rules controlling fishing activity, nearly half of those
interviewed perceive high levels of rule-breaking. Ordinal regres-
sion modelling revealed immigrant status, gender and individual
perceptions of marine resource health are significantly linked to
high levels of perceived rule-breaking. Investigation of the level to
which these relationships exist in a coastal community could be
used to better contextualise stakeholder-led processes that inform
on developing rules to support conservation objectives. Significant
associations are discussed herein from an implementation
perspective, building on prior research relating compliance to
problem awareness. Implications for informing future manage-
ment and enforcement are provided.
The distribution of responses regarding perceived ‘environmen-
tal health of the sea’ clearly demonstrates recognition of marine
ecosystem degradation and constitutes problem awareness [14] at
the individual level among more than seventy percent of
respondents. In addition to apparent problem awareness, the
ordinal regression analysis applied reveals a significant linkage
between awareness of this environmental problem and respon-
dents’ perception of increased levels of rule-breaking. The current
study does not test willingness to comply or acceptability of rule-
breaking among respondents per se. However, applying existing
propositions from the literature regarding problem awareness at
an individual and societal level, the environmental problem
awareness observed has been shown to be significantly linked to
perceptions of rule-breaking, and is likely to have a strong positive
effect on longer-term decisions on compliance [13]. Amongst
individual respondents who are fishers, perception of marine
environmental degradation and its linkage to rule-breaking
constitutes a positive opportunity for increased compliance
dependent on personal conviction of the validity of rules
[4,9,13]. Equally, those fishers who see deteriorating marine
health as a threat to their livelihoods have an individual incentive
to decide to comply based on egoistic value threat (sensu Stern
[14]). These significant variables can be applied by policy-makers
to tailor and contextualise rules to appeal to these perceptions in a
socially and economically context-specific relevant setting thus
facilitating communication of the problems and possible solutions.
In the current study the belief that marine health is worsening
and the linkage between negative marine health perceptions and
perceived high levels of rule-breaking are shared by the majority of
fishers and non-fisher members of their communities. Thus, while
individual fishers recognise threats directly affecting them, the
question arises as to whether they will also develop a moral sense
of duty to comply in order to protect fishing/coastal community
well-being (social-altruistic values) and the environment (biospher-
ic values) [14]. A moral sense of duty to comply on the basis of
social-altruistic values can be augmented by peer-group expecta-
tion and solidarity, however it is unclear to what degree fishers and
non-fishers publicly voice their concerns regarding marine health
or expectations regarding compliance. Sutinen and Kuperan [2]
argue those fishers who are sensitive to societal or moral
expectations may be motivated to reduce rule-breaking. Even
fishers who do not perceive marine health degradation or do not
associate it with rule-breaking at an individual level, may be
influenced by this perception at a community level if held widely
enough. Policy-makers and managers tailoring rules and manage-
ment measures within a community context can thus effectively
exploit community expectations and problem awareness to
improve compliance. This does not, however, imply improvement
on the basis of increased legitimacy of the governing body creating
those rules [4,9,20].
Without internal or external drivers to commit fishers to
compliance, enforcement is unlikely to be economically viable or
effective [4,6,13]. While some targeted enforcement may be
effective this can only be carried out if the underlying socio-
economic factors determining fishers’ decisions to comply are
understood and addressed [2,3]. The awareness of problems
identified by respondents in the current study highlights an
opportunity at local and wider contexts to influence future
compliance through what Sutinen et al 1990 termed ‘‘greater
use of the non-coercive factors of compliance (social pressure, self
interest, inducement, and obligation)’’ by framing problems using
context-specific management measure options on how they could
be tackled. These non-coercive factors are made more powerful,
wide-reaching and effective through increased community and
individual participation and communication of perceptions. In the
specific context of the area studied this would involve increasing
community group activities, particularly those with a marine
awareness focus and/or with an opportunity for members to
express their concerns about or awareness or marine health
deterioration. Non-coercive factors benefit also from increased
knowledge of the rules and their environmental objectives through
public awareness activities, and from activities to cement
perceptions of the causal relationship between rule-breaking and
marine environmental degradation [3]. In the context of the
current study area, public awareness campaigns highlighting key
rules and indicating effects of the most common forbidden marine
activities on marine health would be valuable.
Table 4. Ordinal regression model (logistic) fishers’ responses to perception of rule-breaking for rules controlling fishing.
(a) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(.|z|)
Immigrant status 1.4543 0.4624 3.1453 0.0016591
Environmental health of sea 20.5250 0.2121 22.4749 0.0133282
(b) Estimate Standard Error z value
1|2 22.0255 1.0790 21.8772
2|3 0.3114 1.0545 0.2953
3|4 2.6657 1.1117 2.3979
(a) Retained explanatory variables fishers (n = 80). (b) Threshold coefficients: (log-likelihood: 289.85624, AIC: 189.7125, Condition number of Hessian: 1294.610).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089156.t004
Perceived Rule-Breaking and Marine Ecosystems
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e89156
There is little available literature to explore the significance of
immigrant status and gender in explaining rule-breaking the final
ordinal regression model presented herein. Immigrant status has
previously been linked to increased negativity of perceptions of
personal health and well-being but has been shown not to increase
rule-breaking behaviour significantly amongst minority immi-
grants in a (developed) urban context [21,22]. While our definition
of ‘‘immigrant’’, not born in this village, is broad in the current
study, immigrants were significantly more likely to perceive rule-
breaking compared with individuals born in the village. It is
possible that immigrants experience less sense of social cohesion
and thus less compulsion to not admit rule-breaking by other
community members, if they sense a lower social cohesion within
their fishing groups they may also not adhere to the usual lack of
self-enforcement among fishers [8]. Conversely, however, if
immigrants are poorly integrated into coastal communities, then
there may be a decreased value of social pressure and obligation to
adhere to rules as non-coercive factors in driving compliance [1
2006]. The results indicate a clear need for future research to
determine the underlying differences in perceptions of rule-
breaking among immigrants. Our inferences remain equivocal
about why women were significantly less likely to perceive rule-
breaking when compared to men, however, this may be best or
partly explained by individual experience of fishing being
extremely low among female respondents. Nonetheless, gender
differences in perceptions towards rule-breaking warrants further
investigation especially in terms of how knowledge on the way
information is passed between different generations and how this
might be used by women to influence compliance behaviour
within their households and communities.
Conclusions
The current study complements existing knowledge identifying
a chain of linkages between environmental awareness and
environmental compliance. It does so by relating, for the first
time, individual perceptions of rule-breaking with perceived
degradation of the marine environment. Empirical data analysis
points out these key linkages, providing insights into complex
compliance processes. This study shows how problem awareness
and orientation can provide a focal point for policy makers to
inform development of more effective marine management
measures. The authors recommend wider application of socio-
economic indicators to aid development of rules that are context-
specific for those targeted and most likely to be impacted. This
may help to identify self-regulation and compliance measures that
can be adopted following promotion of existing non-coercive
factors. Increasing awareness of environmental health through
education programs to target wider understanding of linkages
between marine health and compliance, combined with promoting
social environmental responsibility, are actions recommended as
part of longer term management strategies aimed at supporting
sustainable use of marine resources.
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